In the article “A Simple Proof of Sybil Proof,” the author discusses the concept of Sybil attacks and how they can harm permissionless networks. A Sybil is a node in the network that produces blocks with second-hop routing work, while a non-Sybil produces blocks faster with first-hop routing work. The probability of a Sybil collecting payment is lower because their blocks are less likely to be added to the chain. To reach parity with non-Sybil nodes, a Sybil would have to burn their own money, making their costs higher. The author argues that Sybil attacks are unsolvable and pose a problem for blockchain networks. However, the Saito Consensus offers a solution by reducing the work available to Sybil nodes, making them less profitable. The mechanism and mathematics behind this proof are demonstrated. It is important to note that the Saito routing reward scheme is Sybil Proof because self-cloning nodes reduce their ability to contribute to block production. The article also mentions the distribution of rewards and the expected values for routing nodes in both honest and Sybil cases. It concludes that Saito’s router reward scheme is Sybil Proof and punishes both Sybils and non-competitive nodes.
https://wiki.saito.io/consensus/sybil-proof